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Abstract 
The analysis of efficiency in healthcare has largely focused either on individual healthcare 
providers, or on sub-national health systems conceived as a unique decision making unit. 
However, in hierarchically organised national health services, two separate entities are 
responsible for turning financial resources into services at the local level: health 
administrations and healthcare providers. Their separate roles and the one of health 
administrations in particular have not been explicitly considered in efficiency analysis.  
We applied Stochastic Frontier Analysis to district-level panel data from Mozambique to 
assess districts efficiency in delivering outpatient care. We first assessed the efficiency of 
the whole district  considered as an individual decision making unit, and then we assessed 
separately the efficiency of health administrations and healthcare providers within the same 
district. We found that on average only 73% of the outpatient consultations deliverable with 
the given inputs were realized, with large differences in performance across districts. 
Individual districts performed differently in administrative or healthcare delivery functions. 
On average, a reduction of administrative inefficiency by 10 percentage points, for a given 
budget would increase by 0.2% the volume of services delivered per thousand population 
per year.  Identifying and targeting the specific drivers of administrative inefficiencies can 
contribute to increase service delivery at local level. 
Key words: health system efficiency, health administrations, stochastic frontier analysis, 
efficiency analysis, Mozambique   
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1. Introduction 
Analysing  the productivity and the organizational efficiency of public health systems is 
critical to address the concerns of policy makers who have to ensure the provision of public 
services which better satisfy population needs (Hollingsworth 2013). The existence of 
inefficiencies would imply that public resources could be better used elsewhere, in the 
healthcare or in other sectors, and that variations in efficiency could lead to uneven quality 
of service provision and perceptions of unfairness (Smith and Street 2005). Understanding 
how large inefficiency are and where in the production process improvements could be 
made, is key for Governments (Hollingsworth and Street 2006, Street and Hakkinen 
2009)(Papanicolas and Smith 2014) . Add refs  
Efficiency in healthcare has been analysed as the difference between the observed and 
optimal productivity mostly of  providers, including hospitals, but also individual 
practitioners, primary healthcare units, clinics, nursing homes, public health teams and 
primary healthcare facilities (Hollingsworth and Wildman 2003, Hollingsworth 2008, 
Hollingsworth and Peacock 2008, Hussey, de Vries et al. 2009, Kirigia, Sambo et al. 2011, Au, 
Hollingsworth et al. 2014). The efficiency of health systems has also been addressed, mostly 
at national level through cross-countries comparisons (Gravelle, Jacobs et al. 2003, 
Hollingsworth and Wildman 2003, Greene 2004, Retzlaff-Roberts, Chang et al. 2004), but 
also at sub-national level, by comparing states (Kathuria and Sankar 2005, Prachitha and 
Shanmugam 2012), districts (Kinfu 2013, Kinfu and Sawhney 2015) or lower level health 
authorities (Giuffrida 1999, Giuffrida, Gravelle et al. 2000, Giuffrida and Gravelle 2001, Puig-
Junoy and Ortún 2004, Varela, Martins et al. 2010).  
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Sub-national health systems have been conceived and analysed as a decision-making units 
(DMU). However, in many national health systems organized on a hierarchical basis, sub-
national health authorities are constituted by two types of entities with distinct functions. 
Health administrations (HAs) manage the financial resources to purchase health services 
from local healthcare providers, or to directly provide them with the human and physical 
inputs they require. Healthcare providers, deliver care according to their capacity and to the 
needs of their catchment population (WHO 2000, Robinson, Jakubowski et al. 2005). Due to 
their distinct roles, HAs and HFs can be considered separate DMUs. Measuring their 
performances separately and understanding how they influence the performance of the 
health system at sub-national level could provide insights about where improvements could 
be made (Cacace and Nolte 2011).  
Previous studies have assessed cost-efficiency in contracting health services (Puig-Junoy and Ortún 
2004) or the relative contribution of administrative costs to inefficiencies of local health authorities 
(Giuffrida, Gravelle et al. 2000), or have accounted for the hierarchical organization of healthcare 
delivery in assessing providers’ efficiency through multilevel models (Hauck, Rice et al. 2003, Jacobs, 
Smith et al. 2006). However, nor the efficiency of two separate DMUs with distinct roles and 
production processes (HAs and healthcare providers), nor the way in which local HAs’ efficiency 
influences health providers efficiency have been studies. The role of HAs is even more critical in 
low and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the scarcity of financial resources is 
exacerbated (WHO 2000). Further, due to the decentralization processes undergoing in 
many LMICs, HAs are acquiring growing responsibilities. However, very little is known about 
how they work, perform and affect the health system at the local level (Wickremasinghe, 
Hashmi et al. 2016). 
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We used stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to assess the efficiency of health districts in 
delivering outpatient primary care in Mozambique. As in the existing literature, we first 
assumed that healthcare delivery at local level is the result of an aggregated production 
process, through which financial resources and healthcare inputs are simultaneously 
transformed into services. We then analysed separately the efficiency of HAs in managing 
financial resources to equip and staff health facilities (HFs), and the efficiency of HFs in using 
these inputs to deliver healthcare. We finally assessed the effect of HAs efficiency on 
healthcare delivery by including its measure in the district aggregated production function 
and in the HFs production function. 
This study contributes to the literature on healthcare efficiency in three ways. First, the 
composite nature of local healthcare systems, resulting from the separate contributions of 
HAs and HFs to service delivery, is recognised and conceptualized. Second, HAs’ and HFs’ 
inefficiencies are separately measured and a method to quantify the effect of administrative 
inefficiency on the performance of HFs and district health systems is proposed. Third, the 
sources of bias arising from analysing the sub-national health systems as aggregated DMUs 
are identified.   
By separately analysing the efficiency of the decision making units that contribute to 
healthcare delivery, HAs and HFs, our analysis draws attention upon the overlooked role of 
HAs. By quantifying the effect of administrative on overall district efficiency, and 
investigating some of the channels through which it acts, this study highlight how 
potentially very low cost interventions could target HAs to achieve a more effective use of 
financial resources at local level.   
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2. Study setting  
The large majority of healthcare services in Mozambique are provided by the public sector. 
The National Health System (NHS) follows a centralised top-down hierarchical organization, 
including 10 provinces, 142 districts in the country, and the capital, Maputo City. Districts 
manage secondary and primary care, provided through district hospitals (DH), health 
centres (HC) and clinics  (MISAU 2012). There is generally one DH or HC per district, often 
located in the major urban centre. DH and HC serve as district reference facility since along 
with basic primary care they provide inpatient care and, in DH, minor surgery. Acute and 
specialised care is provided by 10 provincial and central hospitals.  
Like in many sub-Saharan and LMICs, the NHS in Mozambique relies heavily on districts, 
whose HAs organize service provision in line with the national targets and policies set by the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) (MISAU 2012, Wickremasinghe, Hashmi et al. 2016). Specifically, 
district HAs manage financial and non-financial resources to guarantee that HFs have the 
means to operate and deliver services and are therefore responsible for the staff and 
equipment input mix in HFs (HST 1998, MISAU 2002, MISAU 2012, Wickremasinghe, Hashmi 
et al. 2016). The minimum number of staff and equipment are defined by the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) for each type of HF (clinics, health centres and district hospitals) according to 
the catchment area of the facility and to whether it provides services such as surgery or 
maternal care and drive the distribution of healthcare inputs across districts and across HFs 
within the same district (MISAU 2002, MISAU 2012).  
Since the decentralization reform, which began in 2007, the responsibility for hiring human 
resources (HR) has gradually been devolved to district HAs. District health administrators 
are responsible for opening staff vacancies, selecting candidates and legalizing the 
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recruitment according to the national administrative norms. Medical and clinical staff are 
still recruited by central or provincial administrations and allocated to districts. However, 
district HAs have first to communicate their needs to get the recruitment process started 
and then to follow-up with hiring and distributing staff across HFs, paying their salaries and 
managing their careers and benefits, and ultimately retain them. Housing for key health 
cadres, for example health technicians and maternal and child nurses, has emerged as the 
most important factor for HR retention  in rural areas (Vio, Buffolano et al. 2013). The MoH 
recommends that a minimum number of housing should be built next to each HF (MISAU 
2007). The management of housing benefit, including building, renting, maintaining and 
allocating houses, and the daily HR management, depends largely on district health 
administrators.  
While the central or provincial level administrations are responsible for infrastructure 
building and major maintenance, and for the purchase and distribution of drugs and major 
equipment, district health administrators are responsible for the direct procurement of 
small items of equipment and consumables. Therefore, the degree to which the HF’s need 
for drugs, equipment and consumables is satisfied depends on the efficiency of HAs first in 
identifying them, and second in channelling and pursuing them with the higher 
administrative levels, or in directly purchasing what is needed. 
District HFs provide healthcare to meet local populations’ demand given their capacity, 
which is determined by the infrastructure conditions and the availability of staff and 
equipment. The actions of HF staff operating under the various constraints they face 
determine service availability and responsiveness to the population needs, for example 
through HF opening times, attitude towards patients and quality of care provided. In some 
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cases a pro-active attitude of staff can lead to the involvement of community volunteers to 
support health personnel in performing basic health-care tasks or HFs maintenance (MISAU 
2012). The capacity of HF to deliver healthcare is affected by HAs. The level of human and 
physical resources available in a HF are correlated and are the results of the HAs capacity to 
effectively plan, spend resources and allocate inputs. HAs may also influence HFs running 
through support, monitoring and coordination of various HFs within the district (Sherr, 
Cuembelo et al. 2013)      
District recurrent expenditure, including salaries and non-capital expenditure that cover 
running costs, is mostly funded through provincial and district government grants, as well as 
non-earmarked donor resources (referred here as provincial, district and donor financial 
resources for simplicity). District financial resources have progressively increased since the 
implementation of the decentralization reform in 2008 and represented around 40% of the 
total executed recurrent expenditure at district level in 2011. Provincial and donor financial 
resources are allocated to districts according to the number and type of HFs.  District own 
revenues represent a negligible share of their total financial resource and are generated 
from small activities, such as occasionally renting out a room for local events, and minimally 
from user fees, which are very low and from which the large majority of the population is 
exempted. Other donor earmarked funds have supported district level activities, but those 
resources are often either difficult to track in a systematic way, or not managed by district 
administrations (MISAU 2012, Quresky, Cossa et al. 2016). All financial resources, at the 
time covered by this study, were managed by district HAs. No financial resources were 
managed directly by HFs.   
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3. A framework for analysis: aggregated versus two-steps district production process   
We use two alternative frameworks for the analysis of efficiency at the district level and 
compare the results obtained.    
First, we followed the approach taken in the existing studies on local health system 
efficiency implemented in a variety of settings (Giuffrida 1999, Giuffrida, Gravelle et al. 
2000, Giuffrida and Gravelle 2001, Puig-Junoy and Ortún 2004, Kathuria and Sankar 2005, 
Varela, Martins et al. 2010, Prachitha and Shanmugam 2012, Kinfu 2013), and considered 
healthcare delivery at district level as an aggregated production process. We conceived the 
district as an individual decision making unit, made of HA and HFs that transform the 
available inputs (financial resources, staff and equipment) into healthcare, measured here 
through outpatient consultations (Figure 1).  
FIGURE 1 
Because of the referral system in place and the inequalities in inpatient and specialized care 
provision across the country, outpatient consultations are the only output delivered by all 
HFs and directly comparable across districts. Financial resources include the total recurrent 
expenditure from multiple sources but managed by the district. Since capital expenditure 
and infrastructure planning are managed at the central and provincial level, and there were 
there were minor changes in the number of HFs in the time period considered the number 
and type of HFs in the district are considered as given at the district level.  
Second, we considered that in Mozambique, as in many hierarchically organised  NHSs (WHO 
2000, Robinson, Jakubowski et al. 2005), the financial management and healthcare delivery 
functions at local level depend on two separate DMUs. We modelled the healthcare 
production at the district level as a two-step process. (Figure 2).  
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FIGURE 2  
In a first-step, HAs use financial resources from three different sources (i.e. government 
provincial expenditure, government district expenditure, and donor common fund 
expenditure) to fund HFs input-mix and recurrent expenditure.  In a second-step, HFs use 
the HR and equipment input-mix to deliver healthcare. 
HAs provide HFs with the input required (for example medical equipment, staff, drugs, 
timely payment of energy bills, maintenance commodities for cleaning and hygiene, food in 
inpatient wards, fuel for transport). HAs identify HFs’ input needs, plan the actions required 
to satisfy them and identify the options that could minimize costs (for example providing 
regular maintenance and organizing the purchasing services for all HFs in the district).  
Differences in HAs abilities (practically planning, management and supervision skills in the 
HA teams) influence the efficiency through which HAs use the available financial resources 
to fund HFs recurrent inputs needed to keep them functioning.  
 
4. Methods 
4.1. District efficiency assuming an aggregated production process 
Following  Fried, Lowell et al. (2006), we defined efficiency as the difference between the 
observed and optimal productivity, measured by ratios of output to input. We used 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to compare the observed level of output to an optimal 
production frontier estimated based on the observed inputs and assumptions on the 
production function. We used a production function, rather than a cost function because 
information on prices was not available and because, due to central purchasing and national 
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directives, the prices of the inputs measured and included in the analysis tend not vary 
across districts.  
We used SFA rather than alternative non-parametric techniques because it allows 
accounting explicitly for measurement error and quantifying the effect of each inputs on the 
production frontier and of factors outside the producers control (Kinfu 2013). Furthermore, 
when panel data are available, SFA models outperform non-parametric techniques if the 
assumed functional form for the production function is close to the underlying production 
technology (Giuffrida and Gravelle 2001). We assumed a Cobb-Douglas functional form for 
f(.) to account for inputs complementarities in healthcare delivery, and assuming constant 
returns to scale. 
We formulated the aggregated district SFA model as: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐷 , 𝛽) 𝐸𝐷(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐷)                                                 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the output (outpatient consultations), delivered by district i at time t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐷 
includes healthcare inputs, here defined as total financial resources for outpatient care and 
HFs staff and equipment. The production frontier 𝑓(Xit
D, β). defines the maximum level of 
output (𝑌𝑖𝑡) attainable by district i at time t, for a given combination of inputs (Xit
D). β is the 
vector of parameters of the production function f (.). ED(Yit, Xit
D) =
Yit
f(Xit
D,β)
 is the district 
efficiency calculated as the ratio of observed production (Yit) to the maximum number of 
consultations deliverable with the inputs available and the technology in use, 𝑓(Xit
D, β).  
We log transformed (1) to obtain a linear equation and applied the Pitt and Lee (1981) 
random effects model for panel data with time invariant inefficiency, to allow controlling for 
district characteristics fixed over time. Important efficiency changes would have been 
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unlikely since the time period considered covered the same government mandate. We 
derived the empirical specification of the Pitt and Lee (1981) SFA model following Greene 
(2008):  
   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐷 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐷 + ε𝑖𝑡
𝐷                             (2) 
where   ε𝑖𝑡
𝐷 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐷 − 𝑢𝑖
𝐷  with  𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐷~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣𝐷
2 ),    𝑢𝑖
𝐷~𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑢𝐷
2 )   and   𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐷 , 𝑢𝑖
𝐷) = 0 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of the yearly number of outpatient consultations per-capita.  
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐷 is a vector of inputs that includes: a) the (natural log of) annual recurrent expenditure for 
outpatient care per capita (see (Anselmi, Lagarde et al. 2015) for details on calculations), a 
proxy for financial resources, which is the sum of the executed district, provincial and donor 
expenditure in district I; b) the (natural log of) average HF staff and equipment, measured 
using an index which averages across HFs the availability of six items: working car, 
autoclave, motorbike, number of basic, medium and high level trained health cadres. While 
the index is not comprehensive of all inputs required in the HF, evidence suggests that the 
availability of HR and major equipment is correlated with that of drugs and other medical 
supplies (Wagenaar, Gimbel et al. 2014).   
For each HF we calculated the average ratio of available resources to the minimum standard 
set by norms for each item  (MISAU 2002). Details on the calculation and further discussion 
of the implications are provided in Anselmi, Lagarde et al. (2015). We used existing norms as 
a benchmark to standardize availability of items across different types of HFs (MISAU 2012). 
We averaged across items to account for the complementarity between staff and 
equipment availability required to deliver effective healthcare and across HF within the 
same district to get a measure of availability in HFs rather than in the district. 
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𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐷 is a vector of district characteristics that capture heterogeneity in the production 
technology and accommodates shifts of the production frontier. 𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐷 includes: a) the (natural 
log of) number of HFs per type per 100,000 population; b) the percentages of HFs with 
access to electricity and to running water (time variant); c) the percentages of population 
that are economically active and illiterate (time invariant); and d) provinces fixed effects to 
control for the influence of provincial management and other provinces characteristics. 
District characteristics and provincial dummies control for differences in the epidemiological 
profile, for which specific data were not available, and in differences in demand for 
healthcare across geographic areas (Anselmi, Lagarde et al. 2015). Provincial dummies also 
control for differences across provincial administrations which in a hierarchical system 
influence both HAs and HFs activities. The observed error term (ε𝑖𝑡
𝐷 ) is a combination of the 
normally distributed stochastic error term ( 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐷) and the non-negative half-normally 
distributed term (𝑢𝑖
𝐷). 𝑢𝑖
𝐷 defines how far the ith district operates below the stochastic 
production frontier and measures the time invariant inefficiency in production (Kinfu 2013).  
We finally obtained estimates of the district relative efficiency score ( 𝐸𝑖?̂? ) from the Pitt and 
Lee (1981) as follows (Greene 2008): 
  𝐸𝑖?̂? = 𝑒
−𝑢𝑖
?̂?
≅ 1 − 𝑢𝑖?̂?                                                                                   (3) 
where 𝑢𝑖?̂? is the input-oriented inefficiency scores obtained with the JLMS estimator 
(Jondrow, Materov et al. 1982). 𝑢𝑖
𝐷 =  
−𝜆ℇ𝑖
𝜎
  where ℇ is half-normally distributed and can be 
estimated using the values provided by the SFA estimates. 
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4.2. District efficiency assuming a two-step production process 
First step: health administration efficiency 
In analogy with the SFA model used for the district integrated production process, we 
derived the empirical specification of the district HAs SFA model as: 
   𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝐴 = α + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐴 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐴  + ε𝑖𝑡
𝐴                                                         (4) 
where ε𝑖𝑡
𝐴 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐴 − 𝑢𝑖
𝐴  with  𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐴~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣𝐴
2 ),  𝑢𝑖
𝐴~𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑢𝐴
2 ) and  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐴, 𝑢𝑖
𝐴) = 0 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝐴 is the natural log of the average HFs staffing and equipment index described in section 
4.1.  
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐴 includes the (natural log) of the recurrent expenditure per HF, for each source of 
funding. To standardize the availability of financial resource per HF across districts 
accounting for differences in number and type of existing HFs, we weighted each HF type 
based on the estimated cost of the minimum staff and equipment they should have 
according to norms (MISAU 2012).  
𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐴 includes the (natural log) of the total number of HFs, the percentages of HF with access 
to water and electricity, the average ratio of houses for personnel available and in good 
conditions compared to the minimum number established by norms (MISAU 2012) as a 
proxy for district capacity for HR retention, and provinces fixed effects.  
As before in equation (3), we estimated 𝐸𝑖?̂? that quantifies the efficiency of HA i. 
 
Second step: health facility efficiency  
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In the second step we derived the empirical specification of the district HFs production 
process as: 
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝐴 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐹  +ε𝑖𝑡
𝐹                                                          (5) 
where ε𝑖𝑡
𝐹 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐹 − 𝑢𝑖
𝐹 with  𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣𝐹
2 ), 𝑢𝑖
𝐹~𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑢𝐹
2 ) and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐹 , 𝑢𝑖
𝐹) = 0 
As in section 4.1, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of the district total outpatient consultations per 
capita. 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝐴 is the (natural log of) average availability of staffing and equipment with respect 
to norms, as in section 4.2.1. 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐹  includes the (natural log of the) number of DH, HC and 
clinics per 100,000 population. 𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐹  includes the percentages of the district population that 
are economically active and illiterate (time invariant) to control for catchment population 
characteristics, the percentages of HFs in the district with electricity and with access to 
running water (time variant), to control for HF conditions, and provinces fixed effects.   
As before, we estimated 𝐸𝑖?̂?, which quantifies the average efficiency of HFs in district i.  
Having estimated the district, HA and HFs efficiency scores (𝐸𝑖?̂?, 𝐸𝑖?̂? and 𝐸𝑖?̂?), we plotted 
them in a graph and calculated their correlation and rank correlation to compare the 
measured district performance under the assumption of an aggregated or two-step 
production process. 
 
4.3. Testing for the effect of health administration efficiency on district and health 
facility efficiency 
We tested for the effect of district administrative efficiency on district and HFs production 
(and efficiency) by including 𝐸𝑖?̂? into the stochastic frontier defined in equations (2) and (5) 
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and looking at the significance of the coefficient associated with it, as done by  Greene and 
Segal (2004) to test the effect of efficiency on profitability.  
We evaluated the goodness of fit of the district and HF models without and with inclusion of 
HA efficiency looking at the log-likelihood and the Akaike information criterion (AIC), testing 
the hypothesis of a null coefficient associated with 𝐸𝑖?̂? and performing a Likelihood-ratio 
(LR) test. Higher log-likelihood, lower AIC and rejection of the LR test null hypothesis 
indicated that the SFA model including administrative efficiency better fitted the data.  
We further compared the aggregated district SFA in equation (2) to a specification including 
𝐸𝑖?̂? but not HF staff and equipment. If the inclusion of staff and equipment levels, along with 
HA efficiency, did not improve the fit for the data, we could infer that the availability of staff 
and equipment depends on financial resources available as well as the HAs efficiency in 
managing them. A two-step model accounting for administrative efficiency would then be 
preferable. 
We tested if accounting for heterogeneity in administrative efficiency affected the 
evaluation of district and HFs performance, by calculating the correlation and rank-
correlation of the efficiency scores estimated from (2) and (5) and from the relative 
counterparts including 𝐸𝑖?̂?. High correlation would indicate a small effect of HA on district 
performance. 
 
4.4. Data  
Data on HF type, staff and equipment for 2008 – 2011 were derived from the National 
Health Information System (NHIS), as provided by the MoH in June 2012 (MISAU 2012). 
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After cross-checking the information with provincial and district annual reports and with 
local health authorities, we retained only information on equipment items that was found 
reliable and for 1.5% of the HFs we replaced staff and equipment figures in a specific year 
with the 2008-2011 average, when the discrepancy between the two was higher than fifty 
percent.   
Figures for provincial and district recurrent expenditure for 2008-2011 were obtained from 
the Ministry of Finance (MF 2012) and MoH budget execution reports (MISAU 2012). To get 
disaggregated district figures for all sources of expenditure, we assumed that donor and 
provincial expenditure were allocated to each district according to the number and type of 
HFs, as it used to be historically (MISAU 2012), and that donor expenditure benefited 
exclusively primary and secondary care, entirely managed at district level.  
Population figures were based on annual projections from the 2007 Census (INE 2010). 
District socio-economic indicators were estimated by the National Institute of Statistics from 
2007 Census data (INE 2008, INE 2010), and were therefore time invariant over the period 
considered in the analysis. 
We merged data at the district level to obtain a single four-year panel database (2008-
2011). We excluded Maputo City from the analysis, due to the presence of specialised and 
private healthcare providers, and eight districts, due to incomplete information. All models 
are estimated using Nlogit 5. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis (Table 1), revealed 
considerable heterogeneity across districts in terms of service delivered, access to 
healthcare, expenditure and population characteristics, driven by differences in population 
density and urbanization. Heterogeneity in expenditure by source reflected the undergoing 
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decentralization process involving the gradual devolution of financial resources to districts, 
which explains the low but increasing district expenditure per-capita. 
TABLE 1  
 
5. Results 
5.1. District efficiency assuming an aggregated or a two-step production process 
The average district efficiency differed if evaluated at the HA, HF or aggregated level. Table 
2 presents the coefficients of the stochastic frontier and the efficiency scores for district, HA 
and HFs.  
On average districts delivered only 73% of the potentially deliverable outpatient 
consultations. The presence of inefficiency could be attributed to inefficiencies in healthcare 
delivery, since for given healthcare inputs HFs delivered only 74% of the attainable 
outpatient consultations, but also to administrative inefficiency. Indeed, on average HAs 
reached only 66% of the HFs staff and equipment levels that they could potentially achieve 
for the given financial resources. The significance of the variance parameters confirmed the 
presence of inefficiency in each of the production processes considered.  
TABLE 2 
When healthcare delivery was analyzed as a unique district process, as expected, we found 
that staff and equipment, financial resources per capita, the presence of a district hospital 
and the proportion of HF with access to water and electricity were positively associated with 
the highest attainable delivery of outpatient consultations per capita per year (Table 2, 
Column 1). On the contrary, the proportions of illiterate and economically active population 
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were negatively correlated with it, reflecting higher barriers to health care use in rural areas 
where education is lower and where a higher proportion of the population recorded as 
economically active (due to higher employment in agriculture rather than informal services 
and businesses).  
When healthcare delivery was analyzed as a two-step production process at district level, 
we found more precise indications of how specific inputs contribute to district efficiency. 
Donor and district expenditures, the proportions of HFs with access to water and electricity, 
and the availability of staff housing, were positively correlated with the highest availability 
of staff and equipment that HAs could have managed to place in HFs (Table 2, Column 2). 
On the contrary, the number of HF in a district was negatively correlated with it for given 
HAs’ inputs. Interestingly, provincial expenditure has no significant effect, probably due to 
its reduction face of an increase in district expenditure arising from decentralization policies.  
As expected, we found that higher availability of staff and equipment in HFs had a positive 
effect on the number of outpatients consultations per-capita per year deliverable by HFs in 
a given district (Table 2, Column 3). The coefficient associated with HF staff and equipment, 
which was hypothesized to depend on financial resources and HA efficiency, was larger in 
the HF production frontier, where expenditure was not included (Table 2, Column 3). It was 
smaller in the district production function where expenditure was included (Table 2, Column 
1). The numbers of HCs and clinics in a district were positively correlated with the HFs 
attainable output. This suggests that the non-correlation between the total number of HFs 
and the district attainable output would therefore reflect the opposite effect of the number 
of HF on the potential service deliverable and on HA management performance. Higher 
proportions of illiterate and economically active population in the district were negatively 
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correlated with the delivery of outpatient consultations, likely reflecting utilization 
constraints in more rural areas.  
The comparison of the efficiency scores and relative rankings of district, HA and HFs through 
scatter plots (Figure 3) and correlation coefficients, indicated that the district aggregated 
health care delivery process is closer to the HFs than to the HAs process in the two-step 
model. HA efficiency and ranking are only mildly correlated with district efficiency and 
rankings (Perason’s correlation: 0.11, p-value: 0.00 and Kendall’s rank-correlation: 0.07, p-
value: 0.09), as illustrated by the dispersion of the relative plots in Figure 3.a. Similarly, HA 
and HF efficiency scores and their ranks are different (Figure 3.b) and not significantly 
correlated (Perason’s correlation: 0.01, p-value: 0.87 and Kendall’s rank-correlation: -0.05, 
p-value: 0.26). Aggregated district and HF efficiency scores and their ranks were highly 
correlated (Perason’s correlation: 0.86, p-value: 0.00 and Kendall’s rank-correlation: 0.88, p-
value: 0.00) and very similar, as illustrated by their plots close to the 45 degree line (Figure 
3.c).  
FIGURE 3  
 
5.2. The effect of health administration efficiency on district and health facility 
efficiency  
Table 3 shows SFA estimates including HA efficiency for aggregated district, with and 
without HF staff and equipment (Columns 1 and 2), and for HFs.  
TABLE 3 
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When included in the district production function, the HA efficiency score had a positive and 
significant effect on the deliverable outpatient consultations, as illustrated by the coefficient 
in the aggregated district production frontier (Table 3, Column 1). When comparing the 
aggregated district model without and with HA efficiency (Table 2, Column 1 and Table 3, 
Column 1) the higher log-likelihood, the lower AIC criterion and LR test suggested that 
accounting for administrative efficiency improved the model fit. The LR test (LR=6.61>3.84) 
rejected the hypothesis of the coefficient associated with the administrative efficiency being 
null.  
After the inclusion of the HA efficiency score, the coefficient associated with district 
expenditure was larger and the coefficient associated with the HF staff and equipment was 
no longer significant. This indicate that the effect of HF staff and equipment in an 
aggregated district production function is fully explained by the availability of financial 
resources and the efficiency of HAs in using them. The LR test (LR=0.414<3.84) comparing 
the model specification in Table 3, Column1 and Table 3, Column2 confirmed that the 
inclusion of HF staff and equipment did not improve the model fit.   
Once the availability of inputs for health service delivery is accounted for, HA efficiency has 
no significant effect on the estimated HFs’ production frontier and efficiency scores (Table 3, 
Column 3). This suggests that HA efficiency influences healthcare delivery only through the 
level of staffing and equipment in HFs. The smaller log-likelihood, the higher AIC criterion 
and the LR test (LR=2.11<3.84) comparing the model in Table 2, column 2 with the model in 
Table 3, Column 3 confirm that the inclusion of administrative efficiency does not improve 
the model fit to the data.  
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While the inclusion of HA efficiency in the district and HFs healthcare production models 
affected the responsiveness (elasticity) of healthcare delivery to each input, but not the 
measured district or HFs efficiencies. Indeed the coefficients associated with the inputs 
changed when the HA efficiency scores were included in the analysis, but not much the 
efficiency scores. Both the district and HFs efficiency scores resulting from the SFA models 
with and without HAs’ efficiency were very highly correlated (Pearson’s correlation: 0.99, 
Kendall’s rank-correlation: 0.99), indicating that the measured performance was not 
affected by the inclusion of HA efficiency.  
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
SFA estimates of efficiency may be sensitive to the assumptions made about the distribution 
of the inefficiency term and the definition of the model used (Street 2003, Kumbhakar, Lien 
et al. 2014). We therefore calculated the confidence intervals of the efficiency scores and 
performed a number of robustness checks. We carried out the same analysis first assuming 
an exponential distribution for the inefficiency terms 𝑢𝑖
𝐷, 𝑢𝑖
𝐴, and 𝑢𝑖
𝐹, rather than half-
normal, and second measuring healthcare output in service units. The latter is a composite 
weighted measure used in Mozambique’s NHS planning which includes inpatient days, 
institutional deliveries, vaccinations doses, outpatient consultations and maternal and child 
health consultations (MISAU 2012). Under the assumption of exponential distribution for 
the inefficiency term, the stochastic frontier coefficients associated with input factors and 
the relative efficiency scores were very similar to those in the original model. When output 
was measured in service units, differences in the magnitude of coefficients, and for some 
district characteristics in significance, were found, reflecting the different nature of the 
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production process. However, the significant and positive effect of administrative efficiency 
on the district but not on the HFs production frontier, was confirmed by both robustness 
checks. The correlation and rank correlation between the efficiency scores obtained from 
the original model and the one with exponential distribution (between 0.98 and 0.99) and 
the one with service units output (0.52 and 0.60) indicate sensitivity of results to the output 
definition rather than distributional assumptions. 
Although less frequently done in the literature, we estimated alternative SFA models 
assuming a translog production function and using a true random effects model. The non-
convergence of the maximum likelihood function, due to collinearity in the data, indicated 
that these models would not better fit the data.   
 
6. Discussion  
In this study we set out to assess the efficiency of health districts in delivering outpatient 
primary care in Mozambique and specifically of health administration and healthcare 
providers in performing their roles. We estimated efficiency both assuming an aggregated 
healthcare delivery process and a two-step process, where HAs and HFs hold the separate 
responsibilities of managing financial resources to purchase healthcare inputs and of using 
them to deliver services. We found evidence of inefficiency at the aggregated district level 
(average efficiency score 73%) that could be attributed to both HAs (average efficiency 
score 66%) and HFs (average efficiency score 74%). We found variation in performance 
across districts, and in the performance of the same district when evaluated at the HA, HF or 
aggregated district level. Performances at the HFs and aggregated district level were similar, 
since they were both evaluated with respect to the volume of services delivered. We found 
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evidence that administrative efficiency, affected HFs and district healthcare delivery through 
the availability of staff and equipment.  
The results obtained are in line with those of the literature on sub-national health systems 
in LMICs settings (Kathuria and Sankar 2005, Varela, Martins et al. 2010, Kinfu 2013). 
Indeed, we found a great variability in input availability and in environmental factors, which 
affected district performance, emphasizing the importance of accounting for heterogeneity 
in efficiency analysis (Greene 2004). However, the comparison of the aggregated versus the 
two-step district healthcare production revealed that in settings where at local level 
financial administration and healthcare delivery functions are attributed to separate 
organizations, a model accounting for administrative inefficiencies would perform better. 
This finding would apply to hierarchically organised public health systems, such as 
Mozambique, but possibly also to the analysis of efficiency in other contexts (for example 
the allocation of inputs across specialties in a hospital) or in other public sectors where the 
financial management and service delivery functions are split.  
Results suggest that the existing studies, which assume an aggregated production process at 
the subnational level, tend to capture HFs rather than HA performance, and may generate 
misleading conclusions about the factors that influence district performance. First of all they 
ignore the role of HAs, which determine the availability of inputs for health care delivery in 
HFs. Secondly, it may lead to biased estimates of healthcare delivery responsiveness to 
specific inputs. For example, where an input such as the number of facilities has opposing 
effects on HA and HF production frontier, these may cancel each other out leading to an 
insignificant coefficient on district healthcare delivery. Estimating the effect of specific 
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inputs correctly and precisely could avoid the formulation of ineffective policy 
recommendations and provide indications for more specifically targeted intervention.  
Although the final estimated district efficiency in healthcare delivery is similar in the 
aggregated and two-steps models, the analysis of the production process and performance 
of distinct organizations separately provides more precise insights on where inefficiencies 
are. For example, we found that in the period of study only 66% of the attainable levels of 
staff and equipment for given financial resources were available in HFs. Although the focus 
of the policy debate is on the improvement of health care conditions and delivery processes 
at the HF level, increasing HA efficiency is crucial to promote the effective use of available 
financial resources at district level.  Increasing HA efficiency may translate into up to an 
average 34% increase in HFs staff and equipment without additional recurrent expenditure. 
Tackling administrative efficiencies will result into increased healthcare delivery. On the 
contrary, increasing financial resources without addressing HA inefficiencies may not 
produce the expected outcome, even when HFs are efficient. On average, a reduction of 
administrative inefficiency by 10 percentage points, for a given budget would increase by 
0.2% the volume of services delivered per thousand population per year.    
The study presents limitations common to SFA models or related to data availability, 
particularly in LMICs, and common to existing studies of sub-national health systems 
efficiency. The definition of input and outputs is limited by data availability and may reduce 
the potential to evaluate the performance of sophisticated production processes, with 
multiple objectives, such as healthcare including not only outpatient but also inpatient more 
complex care. Furthermore, no distributional and quality concerns were explicitly included. 
However, the staff and equipment index first includes essential healthcare inputs, HR 
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availability in particular, which are likely to be correlated with other inputs (Wagenaar, 
Gimbel et al. 2014), and second, it incorporates distributional concerns since it accounts for 
resource distribution across HFs according to the minimum requirement set by norms.  
In developing both the aggregated and the two-step models we follow previous studies 
focusing on similar settings (Kinfu 2013) and use a Cobb-Douglas production function which 
assume complementarities between inputs. Although the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
assume constant returns to scale, and the same returns to scale across districts, it is possible 
that returns to scale vary at different levels of inputs and across districts. In particular 
provincial administrations may influence returns to scale and economies of scale and in 
spite of national directives prices vary across districts (Arndt, Jones et al. 2015). Differences 
in the incentives for staff, such as the implementation of pay for performance schemes, 
which began to be applied in some provinces only in 2012, may also affect productivity. 
Such differences should be considered by further studies.  
Since measures of disease prevalence were not available at district level, the coefficients 
associated with district characteristics should be interpreted with caution since they are 
potentially biased by this omission. 
Although potential limitations related to the data available exist, in this study the use of 
routine data has allowed to advance in comparison with previous studies focusing on similar 
settings.  
Our findings lad to a number of recommendation for further research investigating 
efficiency of sub-national health system  with the aim of informing policies improving 
effectiveness in the use of public health resources. First, modelling separately the functions 
of HAs and HFs within districts can allow assessing the efficiency of each institutions and 
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understand which districts are underperforming in which functions. Second, the use of 
different models for HAs and HFs production process allows to identify the effect of each 
input within the whole district healthcare delivery process. Third, while the inclusion of HA 
efficiency in the district and HFs production function does not affect the performance 
measurement, it improves the precision of estimates of the effect of each input. Finally, 
research on health system performance should explicitly account for the organizational 
architecture of the health system and the role of health administrations. The use of 
contextual knowledge about the healthcare production processes to inform efficiency 
analysis are recommended to enhance the analysis of healthcare production processes and 
the understanding of which specific policy interventions can improve their efficiency.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Studying the effect of administrative efficiency on district and HFs performance has shown 
that analyzing each production process separately is more informative than assuming an 
aggregated production process at the health system sub-national level. While district 
performance measured under the assumption of an aggregated production process reflects 
HFs performance, it is driven by both the performances of HA in using financial resources to 
staff and equip HFs and the performance of HF in delivering healthcare.  
Differences in performance across districts and HA, HFs or aggregated level within districts 
exist. The significant effect of administrative efficiency on healthcare delivery through the 
availability of staff and equipment in HFs, indicates that improving local capacity for 
resource administration may alone increase the volume of healthcare delivered at no 
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additional cost. Further research on health system efficiency should separately assess HA 
and HF performances and investigate their specific drivers.  
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Figure 1.  District aggregated healthcare production process 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Two-step district healthcare delivery production process in Mozambique 
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Figure 3. Comparison of district, health administration and health facilities efficiency 
scores and rankings, Mozambique (2008-2011)  
a) Health Administration and District 
 
b) Health Administration and Health Facilities 
  
c) Health Facilities and District 
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Table 1. District descriptive statistics, Mozambique 2008-2011 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Output      
Outpatient consultations per capita per year 1.08 0.46 0.19 2.50 
Inputs     
HF staff and equipment index 45.80 14.67 17.35 92.49 
Total expenditure per capita (MZM) 138.26 101.67 6.84 646.12 
Government district expenditure per capita (MZM) 41.74 54.90 0.00 339.98 
Government provincial expenditure per capita (MZM) 20.55 15.67 2.44 127.83 
Donor provincial expenditure per capita (MZM) 12.63 8.24 2.08 77.93 
Government district expenditure per HF (1,000 MZM) 5.28 8.44 0.00 72.15 
Government provincial expenditure per HF (1,000 MZM) 134.29 47.77 45.06 276.03 
Donor provincial expenditure per HF (1,000 MZM) 85.31 24.54 44.02 146.32 
District characteristics     
District hospitals (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.16 0.30 0.00 1.68 
Health centres (per 100,000 inhabitants) 1.43 1.68 0.00 12.39 
Clinics (per 100,000 inhabitants) 7.39 5.40 1.09 41.12 
Total number of HF per district  8.70 3.72 3.00 20.00 
HF with water (percentage) 42.27 28.78 0.00 100.00 
HF with electricity (percentage) 29.09 27.24 0.00 100.00 
HF housing availability (ratio actual to norms) 0.98 0.66 0.00 3.63 
Economically active population (percentage) 72.77 8.59 38.50 87.80 
Illiterate population (percentage) 55.85 15.26 14.40 79.80 
N=532 (133 districts over 4 years) 
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Table 2. District, health administration and health facility stochastic frontiers and 
efficiency scores, Mozambique (2008-2011) 
Production 
Process 
(Decision Making Unit) 
Aggregated         
(District) 
Two-step 
         (Health 
Administration) 
Two-step       
(Health Facilities) 
Stochastic Frontier 
      
Inputs 
   
    HF staff and equipment index 0.132 ** 
  
0.201 *** 
 
(0.054) 
   
(0.056) 
 
Total expenditure per capita (MZM) 0.271 *** 
    
 
(0.025) 
     
Government district expenditure per HF (MZM) 
  
0.037 *** 
  
   
(0.005) 
   
Government provincial expenditure per HF (MZM) 
  
0.069 
   
   
(0.043) 
   
Donor provincial expenditure per capita (MZM) 
  
0.160 *** 
  
   
(0.037) 
   
District characteristics 
    
District/Rural hospitals (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.237 *** 
  
0.114 * 
 
(0.054) 
   
(0.061) 
 
Health centres (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.009 
   
0.116 *** 
 
(0.038) 
   
(0.032) 
 
Clinics (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.082 
   
0.159 *** 
 
(0.054) 
   
(0.051) 
 
Total number of HF 
  
-0.203 *** 
  
   
(0.072) 
   
HF with electricity (percentage) 0.002 * 0.004 *** 0.002 * 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
HF with water (percentage) 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
HF housing availability (ratio actual/minimum standard) 
 
0.060 *** 
  
   
(0.014) 
   
Illiterate population (percentage) -0.015 *** 
  
-0.011 *** 
 
(0.003) 
   
(0.003) 
 
Economically active population (percentage) -0.009 ** 
  
-0.007 * 
 
(0.004) 
   
(0.004) 
 
Constant -0.529 * 1.093 
 
0.221 
 
 
(0.293) 
 
(0.798) 
 
(0.279) 
 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes 
       Variance Parameters 
      
Lambda 1.790 *** 2.633 *** 1.558 *** 
 
(0.261) 
 
(0.419) 
 
(0.201) 
 
Sigma(u) 0.334 *** 0.406 *** 0.319 *** 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.033) 
 
       Log likelihood 30.779 91.323 -5.850 
AIC -19.600 -144.600 51.700 
  
      
Efficiency scores 
      
Mean 0.730 0.662 0.742 
Std. Dev. 0.178 0.214 0.167 
Minimum 0.175 0.001 0.098 
Max 0.968 0.976 0.957 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
      
N=532 (133 districts over 4 years) 
      
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
      All Stochastic Frontier Inputs in natural log 
       
36 
 
Table 3. District and health facility stochastic frontiers and efficiency scores, accounting 
for health administration efficiency, Mozambique (2008-2011) 
Production Process                                                  
 (Decision Making Unit) 
Aggregated          
(District) 
Two-step       
(Health Facilities) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Stochastic Frontier 
      
    Inputs 
   
HF staff and equipment index 0.037 
   
0.251 *** 
 
(0.072 ) 
  
(0.078) 
 
Total expenditure per capita (MZM) 0.308 *** 0.317 *** 
  
 
(0.027 ) (0.025 ) 
  
District characteristics 
   
District/Rural hospitals (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.247 *** 0.253 *** 0.118 ** 
 
(0.060 ) (0.058 ) (0.059) 
 
Health centres (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.013 
 
0.012 
 
0.107 *** 
 
(0.038 ) (0.038 ) (0.033) 
 
Clinics (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.050 
 
0.043 
 
0.171 *** 
 
(0.059 ) (0.056 ) (0.054) 
 
HF with electricity (percentage) 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 0.001 
 
 
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001) 
 
HF with water (percentage) 0.001 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001) 
 
Illiterate population (percentage) -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.012 *** 
 
(0.004 ) (0.004 ) (0.003) 
 
Economically active population (percentage) -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.007 * 
 
(0.004 ) (0.004 ) (0.003) 
 
Health Administration efficiency score 0.290 ** 0.336 *** -0.156 
 
 
(0.130 ) (0.095 ) (0.120) 
 
Constant -0.506 
 
-0.441 * 0.134 
 
 
(0.309 ) (0.265 ) (0.294) 
 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes 
       Variance Parameters 
      
Lambda 1.799 *** 1.801 *** 1.556 *** 
 
(0.265 ) (0.267 ) (0.197 
 
Sigma(u) 0.333 *** 0.333 *** 0.318 *** 
 
(0.036 ) (0.036 ) (0.032) 
 
       Log likelihood 34.068 33.861 -4.795 
AIC -24.100 -25.700 51.600 
  
      
Efficiency scores 
      
Mean 0.731 0.730 0.744 
Std. Dev. 0.179 0.179 0.167 
Minimum 0.234 0.238 0.137 
Max 0.967 0.967 0.959 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
      
N=532 (133 districts over 4 years) 
      
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
      All Stochastic Frontier Inputs in natural log 
       
 
 
 
 
